COMMENTARY

rIS

THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?

NO FAILURES AFTER THE S&L
CRISIS? DON'T BANK ON IT
Well, the director of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation was on
"Nightline" again the other night. Trying
to calm troubled waters, aware that lack
of confidence can lead to panic which
can lead to mass withdrawals, in turn
justifying the panic, and in self-fulfilling
fashion, spawning more of it.
The discussion on the talk shows and
in the popular press is depressingly illinformed about basic economics. The
January 8 "Nightline" sequence consisted of an expert repeating the need for
"early intervention" to take over troubled banks more quickly. Journalist Jane
Bryant Quinn opined that intervention is
needed to save the banks, and that there
is little other choice or little one can do
but pay because they are "so important
to all of us." And the entire discussion
became a consensus nod that the only
danger would be a "taxpayer bailout"
such as is occurring with the savings and
loan industry.
So this becomes a problem only if
general fund monies are tapped? How is
it that our pundits, including those who
cover this industry, are so blind to basic
economics? Why is the role of special
insurance funds such as the FDIC, or its
tragic sister FSLIC, so little understood?
[Of course, the more discerning among
us (and since you are reading this publication, you are certainly included) have
long been aware that many of our visible
pundits, as professional pontificators,
make up only in false bravado and arrogant certitude what they lack in knowledge.]
Let's establish a few basics. First, the
FDIC is supposed to insure the first
$100,000 in each depositor's account.
So the Bank of New England is in trouble... what is the FDIC doing? It takes
over the bank and assumes its bad loans,
to be borne by its insurance Fund, in
order to make it an asset attractive for
purchase by another bank. That is not
insuring the first $100,000 in deposits of
each depositor-that is bailing out the
big depositors, the whole operation, at a
cost of around $3 billion. Three billion
dollars is a lot of money. But, the experts
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assure us, that doesn't matter because it
comes from the Fund; the real concern is
whether the taxpayer will have to pay to
replenish the Fund if its contributors
can't.
Wrong. We are also the Fund.
The FDIC is created by contributions
from banks. Its sustenance does not drop
from the skies as manna. The contributions are compelled and operate as an
industry-wide tax. Any fee imposed
across an entire industry is largely paid
by the consumers of the services
involved. It is a pass-through. We pay
for this fund in our credit card
charges-now at what, more than twice
the prime rate, in lower bank interest
rates payable to us, in automatic teller
charges, in checking account charges, in
higher home loans, points, and other fees
the banks charge us. The amount is
spread out to most of us, probably to a
larger number than feed the general fund
everyone focuses on. It seems to be an
American affliction: a tax is not a tax if it
is not called a tax and I do not actually
see the money taken away at a counter or
written as a check to the IRS or Franchise Tax Board or the local County
Treasurer.
So let's get things straight...we are
paying for the FDIC Fund. That is our
money in there. If it requires replenishment from the banks, the bank stockholders will not pay very much of it at
all; it will be passed on to us as consumers of this industry, and that means
most all of us.
The second thing the pundits do not
understand is how insurance works to
socialize risk, and how it affects incentives and profit-directed activity. When
the FDIC totally bails out the Bank of
New England, it is not operating as a
Fund to assure $100,000 protection so
widows and orphans do not lose their
homes. No, it is going to be used (probably improperly, maybe illegally) to bail
out anyone who fails and to protect all
depositors of that institution. And who
pays? Depositors of all institutions,
including those who banked at slightly
lower interest rates received from banks
which were a bit more conservative and
sensible.
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Here is the flaw in undifferentiated
socialization of risk by such a Fund. It
creates a false incentive to take risks. It
encourages foolhardy risk. It...guarantees no loss. It is not a no-lose proposition, but it is too close to one. If a bank's
crazy loans, junk bonds, or South American Amazon road financing ventures
make it, it makes a fortune. The executives continue on with their million-dollar salary/bonus packages. The stockholders see their shares double in value.
If, however, the bank loses and the gamble goes the path of Pete Rose Way, the
bank does not have to worry about the
IRS, or the U.S. Attorney, or bankruptcy,
or the total loss of the equity investment
by its stockholder owners. No. The Fund
will take over its losers and it will skate
with little or no loss. Heads I win, tails I
don't lose. [Of course, this description is
not universally applicable; the Fund will
not bail out small local banks heavily
investing in their local communities,
only the big high flyers ... because, as
Jane Bryant Quinn will tell you, these
banks, which she has covered for some
time, are very important.]
As a banker, if you do not join this
parade of gamblers, you are assured of
losing. Because some of the gamblers
are winning, and they are therefore
attracting capital. They are your competitors, and you are rather compelled to
gamble yourself.
The tough question is, how do you
solve this problem? How do you create
an industry able to attract capital, give
security to accountholders, and yet not
create false incentives to risk?
The public discussion thus far has
been pathetic. As is normal in these circumstances, you have knee-jerk partisans for drum-tight regulation; and then
you have the University of Chicago
deregulators, who worship a marketplace existing only in the imaginations
of theorists. They would simply deregulate, as if they were deregulating into
some kind of neutral "natural order."
And if any of you are unfortunate
enough to discuss these issues in front of
a legislative body, you'll see the zenith
of this kind of parodied "it has to be one
or the other." The Republicans stubbornly urge deregulation, pointing to bureaucratic stifling of any risk as inhibiting
investment in banks and savings and
loans. And the Democrats cite the horrors of the deregulation of the airline and
S&L industries to argue for "regulation."
And all you get from them is a big YES
to regulation or a big NO.
What is lost in this rhetorical discussion by partisans is the fact that there
are many, many different kinds of
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regulation. Indeed, contrary to the conservative shibboleths, the executive
branch is not the only intervenor. Absent
the executive branch, there are still commercial rules of practice, a common law,
mores, statutes, a court system. There
would be a lot of regulation of banking
even if there were no banking regulators.
The conservatives are right that, all other
things being equal, less regulation is better; put differently, if we can let the selfcorrecting efficiency of the marketplace
regulate, let's do it. The issue is how we
regulate and who does it, and which way
works better at lower system cost.
Should we eliminate FDIC insurance? No. It performs a useful social
function. People should not suffer total
annihilation of the last of their savings
because they made an error in choosing
their banker. The information is too
imperfect to the consumer, the consequences too great, and the complicity of
the state too extensive in granting charters and assuring solvency. But why not
change the system to inhibit the crosssubsidy of the loser by the responsible-funded really by all of us? Why not
establish some ground rules to make the
system work without gratuitously preventing capitalization?
Here is our list of defensible reforms:
they do not bespeak a "regulate" or a
"deregulate" panacea. Rather, they are
designed to accomplish public protection through a mix of effective but minimally intrusive incentives and interventions.
1. Insure 80% of the first $200,000,
and limit the $200,000 to a per individual maximum. The purpose of FDIC
insurance is to soften the catastrophic
blow to those who cannot legitimately
judge the solvency of these institutions.
As amounts climb above the current
$100,000 and beyond, the ability to
judge the institution increases and the
deposit takes on a less personal character
and becomes more commercial. What
social gain is there in requiring persons
to inefficiently place holdings in twenty
different institutions, and why should
someone able to do so receive protection
meant for those facing impoverishment
if there is a failure?
However, insure only 80% so the
depositors take some risk and have some
incentive not to give their money to an
institution which will use it on excessively risky ventures. This change raises
the ceiling to up to $160,000 per individual, more than the current $100,000. But
it provides the proper incentive for every
person, while removing currently prevalent coverage outside the intent of the
Fund.
2. Vary required contributions to

the FDIC Fund based on the degree of
risk in the kinds of loans and investments made. Insurance firms do this all
the time in the private sector. Your dune
buggy may well have a higher premium
than a safer vehicle of the same value. A
person who acts to minimize risk normally receives a lower premium. Obviously, it may not be possible to fine-tune
such premium variation with precision,
but some basic rules and risk categories
should trigger higher contributions.
3. The Fund must not be used to
relieve uncovered depositors, or the
bank's stockholders. Do not violate the
Fund's basic purpose by using it to pick
up the entire tab, as the FDIC is regrettably doing for the Bank of New England. It is critical to require the stockholders to pay a serious price for the
failure. They are the ones who own the
bank; they picked the directors who
chose the management who made the
decisions-all operating to advance the
financial welfare of themselves. If the
FDIC is to make the mistake of seizing,
rectifying, and selling, it must be
arranged so the existing stockholders not
only receive no dividends, but pay the
brunt of the diminution in value.
Apart from incentives, we may be
able to take some precautionary measures. The next level of worthy measures
has to do with early warning and information.
4. Repeal the overly solicitous
exemptions of financial institutions
from the disclosure requirements of
the federal Freedom of Information
Act, the California Public Records
Act, and related statutes. These
exemptions deprive the public of current information about the financial
condition of regulated institutions. At
present, it is considered refined thinking
to keep the public in the blind about a
teetering enterprise. "If you let people
know there may be a problem by opening up the bank's condition to the public,
then a small blip of a problem will create
a panic and generate the very collapse
you want to avoid."' Let us say that we
have heard that line before, and it is, in
reality, disingenuous. As a nine-year
white collar crime prosecutor, this author
has heard that line repeatedly, universally, by the defenders and even the victims
of Ponzi schemes. "Don't blow the whistle yet, just a few more sales and it will
all turn out...this is just a bad blip." In
the vast majority of financial institution
failures, the sum result of this approach
has been to secrete from new depositors
and investors important information
about the institution in which they are
putting their money; and it almost invariably leads to a lot more people drowning

on a sinking ship. Quite often, more people board the swamped vessel after the
leak than were on it before it sprung. The
newcomers are defrauded in order to bail
out those on board. Our answer: fine, but
let them know the condition of the boat.
Contrary to the theory of the defenders of paternalistic secrecy, disclosure
will not mean instant panic. There would
be some instant panic now because of a
self-fulfilling prophecy: little information is released publicly and when-it happens it is too late and always means disaster. If information were available
earlier and became routine, a small problem would yield what the market always
yields-a small response; a bigger problem would yield a bigger response. In
other words, use the market here, too.
Let people choose; let them know.2

5. Establish meaningful accounting
rules. Abandonment of the traditional
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for Regulatory Accounting
Principles (RAP) helped to disguise the
weaknesses of savings and loan institutions from the public and regulators.
Tighten definitions in GAAP and apply
them with independence and fidelity.
The pattern of reporting assets at values
wildly disparate from market measures
has impeded early warning of trouble.

6.Establish an affirmative duty on
accountants to report financial condition in a proper and professional manner; add an affirmative duty to report
to a regulator any attempt to alter or
secrete evidence of financial condition
in a way likely to mislead; prosecute
those who violate this obligation both
civilly and criminally, and revoke
their licenses. Accountants have been
knowing accomplices in the savings and
loan debacle. Touche Ross & Co., now
merged with Deloitte, Haskins & Sells,
has been sued for failure to examine
properly the records of Beverly Hills
Savings & Loan; the former Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells was accused of negligence for its work with Sunrise Savings
& Loan in Florida; Coopers & Lybrand
is now defending its audit of a borrower
in a suit brought by Freedom Savings &
Loan; Ernst & Young has been accused
of false audits for financial institutions in
Tennessee. 3 The FDIC itself now has
thirty lawsuits pending against accounting firms. Another 1,400 investigations
of savings and loans are under way. Do
not think bank accounting suffers from a
different professional standard. The
accused firms are among the leading
accounting partnerships in the nation.
Although the imminent likely comeuppance may have some cautionary
effect on the profession, it will not be
sufficient. For an accounting firm faces
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an immediate and certain pay-off for its
silence, and a risk only if things turn
south. And, if it reports accurately, it
may believe that its reports will themselves turn things south-with a prior
history of its own reassurances sitting on
the record. Accounting firms are trapped
in their own false incentives to play
along. In order to have preventive information of the kind needed, they must be
required to report and given immunity
for it.
The accountancy profession is one
which has focused traditionally on barring entry into its ranks [it has often
maintained an examination passage rate
of below 20%]; and on cartel practices to
enhance the exclusivity of its services
[see the following Commentary detailing current self-serving efforts by the
CPA profession in California, now being
challenged in Moore v. Board of
Accountancy]. It is a profession whose
raison d'etre is the reliable and consistent certification of financial condition.
If it is relied upon to accomplish that
end, and it consistently fails to do so,
then its presence in this world may be a
net harm; it is better to know there is no
reliable assurance than to think there is
when there is not. Since what it does has
potential benefit, it should be required to
provide that benefit as a prerequisite to
continued status as a defined profession.
7. Hold attorneys liable for violation of ethical rules; disbar those who
violate them. It is somewhat more difficult to require attorneys to report affirmatively the wrongdoing of their clients
because of the traditional attorney-client
privilege. But they should not be let off
so quickly. First, that privilege does not
apply to continuing crimes. Most of the
financial manipulations risking the
assets of financial institutions are
arranged by counsel ... and they are
indeed continuing crimes in which counsel participate. It is appropriate to criminally prosecute attorneys involved in
such schemes, to hold their assets civilly
liable, and to disbar them as warranted.
Second, attorneys are not only allowed
to resign as counsel where unlawful acts
are occurring against their advice; current Rules of Professional
Conduct
4
require them to so resign.
The FDIC currently has 25 lawsuits
pending against law firms, some of them
among our largest. For example, Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue has just been sued
for $149 million for its involvement with
two failed Texas thrifts. A great deal of
work must be done about attorney honesty.
8. Categorically prohibit self-dealing by directors, managers, and other
fiduciaries of bank assets. Those who
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manage a bank have a very special fiduciary duty to depositors and-because of
federal insurance-to taxpayers. As we
discuss below, impediments to business
judgment should not be imposed without
thinking through their impact on the
ability to attract capital and provide-yes, dare we say it-important
banking services. But prohibiting selfdealing in a broad categorical brush is a
preventive measure with little inhibiting
effect on legitimate investment. If a person has a legitimate loan application, he
or she can go elsewhere.
9. Invest modestly in regulatory
agencies to monitor financial institutions, with a focus on early warning
and preventive regulatory strategies.
The savings and loan and banking regulatory staffs are pathetically underfunded
in California. The Department of Savings and Loan had about 42 effective
staff during the most tragic financial
debacle in the nation's (and state's) history.' Be assured that having a large staff
does not of itself guarantee effective
monitoring or regulation. The Department of Insurance has a staff of over
600, and those of us who have been
watching it over the past decade would
be hard put to list much of anything it
has done historically warranting its
resources. [It disapproved of exactly one
cartel-set insurance premium rate in the
decade prior to the passage of Proposition 103; engaged in practically no rulemaking; and ignored 4,000 annual consumer complaints.'] But although the
Insurance Department's record would
daunt even an agency-worshipping liberal, opposition to an adequate staff
assures that there cannot be effective
regulation. Better to have no regulation
than a facade upon which people will
rely. Either regulate right or do not do it.
Another group of restraints goes
beyond changing incentives and providing early warning. Some of these have
been implemented with the federal
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)
reforms directed particularly at savings
and loans. 7 Here, we want to be careful.
We do not want to regulate reflexively. It
is possible that a particular abuse will be
prevented by simply prohibiting the
entire category of behavior related to it,
but at what cost? These measures
deserve discussion, but not thoughtless
replication. We would opt for the abovedescribed measures as a higher priority,
and turn to these only as a last resort, and
then impose them in rifle-like fashion as
narrowly drawn as will be effective.
These measures include controls or limits on ownership (e.g., only in-state, a
minimum number of stockholders, only
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a given percent control by any one person or family); prohibition of brokered
deposits; capitalization requirements;
reserve requirements; and investment
limits.
Certainly there must be some minimum measure of security. For when the
public backs the assets of a bank, which
it certainly does through the FDIC, it has
a right to security. In the same way the
bank itself properly demands collateral,
so do the people to protect their investment. But the public should not be so
foolhardy as to require so much security
that the supply of services and capital is
unduly restricted. This is a delicate balance.
It seems anomalous perhaps, but
allowing banks to engage in certain other
businesses, and to invest and function
across a wide geographic area, is generally well-advised-with several caveats.
It is well-advised because operating
across a spectrum of enterprises and
locales may spread the risk, and may
allow capital to go to where it is most
needed by market criteria. And operating
other businesses, such as insurance services, has other societal advantages. For
example, the insurance industry has been
immune from antitrust law for two generations. The Insurance Services Office,
Inc. (ISO) has formulated cartel rules
and practices to enhance premiums and
promote common insurance contract
terms. In November 1988, Proposition
103 carried out the recommendations of
Republican and Democratic Presidential
blue-ribbon commissions, and largely
removed the antitrust exemption for
insurance in California. But old habits
die hard. Where an industry has been
ensconced in the comfort of cartel
arrangement, particularly for lines of
insurance where there are only 1-10 carriers (which includes many of them), the
inertial effects of a longstanding commercial custom not to compete may carry forward. So allowing a large institution such as a bank to compete may
break up such comfortable arrangements
and provide real competition and consumer benefit.
As for the caveats, there are at least
two. First, watch for market abuse by the
banks along traditional antitrust lines. Be
careful to preclude "tie-ins," prohibited
by antitrust law. For example, do not let
banks condition a new account on buying insurance from them as well.
Second, make sure that the required
reserves and capitalization are separate
and distinct from any such venture. Public utility regulators call this "keeping
it below the line." If a bank has adequate reserves in government paper,
make sure they are not borrowed against
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or otherwise encumbered by any such
risk-creating venture. In the same way a
bank will not allow you to put a first
trust deed in front of the trust deed it has
on your house, we cannot permit it to put
anyone between us and the assets we
rightfully require to protect our investment in it.
Let there be no mistake about it: contrary to the pundits, we have an investment in the banks through the FDIC
directly; we don't have to wait for a taxpayer bailout. We are the Fund. And
until the public makes the regulators
aware that it knows more than the professional prognosticators, and demands
the creation of incentives based on real
economics to protect public assets, we
shall remain in hands in which we best
not bank.
FOOTNOTES
1.This is the rationale used to justify
the exemption of records of financial
institutions filed by the regulated institution with state and federal regulators
from the disclosure requirements of the
federal Freedom of Information Act, see
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8), and the California
Public Records Act, see Government
Code § 6254(d)(1).
2. The government's current strategy
is to keep them in the dark. When the
Center for Public Interest Law recently
attempted to get information from the
Department of Insurance about the condition of a troubled insurance company,
one would have thought we were
blueprinting the Poseidon warhead.
After DOI refused CPIL's Public
Records Act request, CPIL filed suit,
Belth v. Gillespie, No. 923654 (San
Francisco Superior Court, filed Sept. 10,
1990), to obtain the requested
records-documents reflecting the
Insurance Commissioner's approval of a
$45 million transfer from Executive Life
Insurance Company to its parent, First
Executive Corporation.
Although
records of this type do not fall within the
Public Records Act exemption for financial information filed with the regulator
by the regulated institution (or the similar Insurance Code section 1215.7), DOI
turned the records over only after suit
was filed and only because First Executive acceded to the request.
3. And finally, belatedly, in November 1990, the state Board of Accountancy filed an accusation seeking to revoke
the California license of Ernst & Young,
alleging gross negligence in its audits of
Lincoln Savings & Loan and its parent
company, American Continental Corporation.

4. See Rule 3-700(B)(1).
5. Statement of William J. Crawford,
California Savings and Loan Commissioner, in Savings and Loan Crisis:
Field Hearings before the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 426 (Jan. 12-13,
1989). In fiscal year 1989-90, the state
Department of Banking had only 135
employees dedicated to the licensing and
supervision of banks and trust companies.
6. See, e.g., information on Bourhis v.
Gillespie, No. 907349 (San Francisco
Superior Court, December 1989), in Cal.
Reg. L. Rep. Vol. 10, No. I (Winter
1990) at 110, and Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall
1989) at 97.
7. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(1989). For a description of FIRREA's
provisions, see Oshiro, Partners in
Crime: California'sRole in the $335
Billion Savings and Loan Heist, Cal.
Reg. L. Rep. Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 1990)
at 1,5.
8. Look at the survival of real estate
brokerage commissions at 6% of the sale
price of a home, 10% of the price of raw
land; see People v. National Ass'n of
Realtors, 120 Cal. App. 3d 459, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 728 (1981).
THERE'S NO ACCOUNTING
HOW FAR THE BOARD OF
ACCOUNTANCY WILL GO
The Board of Accountancy licenses
certified public accountants (CPAs). It is
comprised of eight practicing Board
licensees and four public (nonlicensee)
members. Over the past two decades, the
Board has not distinguished itself as a
source of meaningful professional standards, or as a force disciplining dishonest or incompetent accounting practice.
It has been effectively moribund in both
capacities, remaining in a limacine stupor as the profession it regulates has
failed to sound the warning call in the
face of the largest series of accounting
frauds in American financial history: the
savings and loan debacle. During this
profession's torpid somnolence, more
damage has been done to more people
and is causing more economic harm than
all of the previous chicanery in our
nation's history combined. The Board's
energies, however, have historically
been directed at keeping out the infidels,
i.e., new competing CPAs. In this area, it
has managed to flunk in its examinations
70-90% of those who attempt them.
More recently, this sad excuse for a
profession, and sadder excuse for a regulatory body, has stirred from its lethargy
in a burst of cartel energy. Controlled by

CPAs, it has decided that it will simply
prohibit non-CPA accountants-who
have practiced lawfully for decades
under section 5052 of the Business and
Professions Code-from using the terms
"accounting" or "accountant" to describe
their services. This is a neat trick. Since
many individuals and businesses need an
accountant but not necessarily a CPA,
there is fierce competition between
CPAs and other accountants for a significant amount of accountancy business.
What better way to remove competition
than to prevent those opening the phone
book from finding a listing for them?
What better trick than to preclude them
from using the only words which accurately describe their services? And then
the Board used a 1986 law to adopt rules
so it could directly cite nonlicensees and
impose fines on them-for using a term
they have used for decades to describe
their services.
This issue is in litigation, and the California Supreme Court recently granted-unanimously-a petition to review
the First District Court of Appeal's
regrettable decision in Moore v. California State Board of Accountancy,' a case
challenging the Board's authority to
impose its proprietary will through the
vehicle of the state of California. To fully appreciate the absurdity of this
Board's attempt to privatize our State for
the narrow aggrandizement of the interest group controlling it, one must review
the applicable law and its history in
some detail, as well as the constitutional
concepts here relevant.
In the Accountancy Act,2 the legislature has provided that a limited number
of accounting tasks (specifically, the
preparation of a formal audit with an
accompanying certified opinion of
soundness) may be performed only by a
CPA. In section 5052, it has carved out a
significant portion of what can only be
characterized as accountancy and
expressly allowed non-CPAs to engage
in it.
In section 5058, the legislature has
specified that only CPAs may use the
title "certified public accountant" and a
large number of other enumerated
accounting titles and abbreviations. On
the three occasions the legislature has
amended section 5058 in the past 45
years, it has never prohibited the use of
the unmodified term "accountant" by
nonlicensee independent accountants
engaged in accounting activities expressly permitted in section 5052.
In 1948, the Board of Accountancy
adopted "Rule 2,"1 which bars non-CPAs
engaged in lawful accounting activity
under section 5052 from using the terms
"accountant" or "accounting" to describe
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themselves or their services. The Board
has generally failed to enforce Rule 2
until recent years-that is, until the fees
for CPA services have soared, putting
them out of the reach of the small business owner, the farmer, the sole practitioner, and the individual consumer who
needs general accounting services but
not the auditing expertise reserved to
CPAs by the legislature.
As the volume of accounting business
diverted from CPAs to unlicensed
accounting practitioners has ballooned,
so has the CPA profession's desire to put
unlicensed accountants out of business,
or at least severely restrict their advertising ability. In particular, CPAs desire to
prevent unlicensed accountants from
advertising in telephone directories
under the heading "Accountant". Rule
2-adopted and now sought to be
enforced by a board dominated by
CPAs-fulfills this desire.
Aside from the obvious statutory
interpretation and commercial speech
issues, we would urge consideration of a
significant due process issue: where a
rulemaking and adjudicatory body consists primarily of licensees belonging to
a specific economic grouping (e.g., one
type of accountant) in competition with
other similar practitioners, is it constitutional for those board members to use
the power of the State to adopt and
enforce rules of practice to their economic advantage against groups not represented in the relevant tribunal?
CPIL believes that the answer is
"no". As discussed below, in Gibson v.
Berryhill,4 the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the Alabama Board of
Optometry (consisting entirely of private-practice licensed optometrists) was
an unfair tribunal for purposes of instituting adjudicatory proceedings against
competitor licensed optometrists employed by corporations. Similarly, California courts have invalidated portions
of the New Motor Vehicle Board Act,
the California Forest Practice Act, the
Dry Cleaners' Act, and the Barber Act
due to the very infirmity present here:
the inherent, due process-violative
unfairness of an industry-dominated regulatory agency improperly attempting to
limit competition and further its own
profit-stake interests. -I
The pending Moore case is not solely
concerned with rulemaking by a state
agency controlled by those with an
impermissible pecuniary interest in the
proceedings; for the CPA-dominated
Board of Accountancy has also attempted to enforce its rulemaking through its
adjudicatory authority. Although dormant for many years, the Board's recent
enforcement of Rule 2 has taken the

form of "cease and desist" letters to unlicensed practitioners, ordering them to
refrain from using the terms "accountant," "accounting," or "accountancy" in
their advertising, business cards, letterhead, or elsewhere to describe themselves or their work. The Board of
Accountancy-which, like other occupational licensing/regulatory agencies,
functions as investigator, prosecutor, and
judge in adjudicatory proceedings-has
aimed its prosecutorial threats at individual unlicensed practitioners, such as
plaintiff Bonnie Moore, who provide
accounting services to small businesses
and individuals. The "cease and desist"
letter sent to Moore in the currently
pending case included the threat of criminal prosecution. The Center contends
that the Board has formulated and
applied this rule for cartel enhancement
purposes, and that the actions of this
unrepresentative, conflict-laden Board
are unconstitutional.
UnconstitutionalRulemaking. CPIL
believes that the Board is constitutionally disqualified from adopting Rule 2. As
noted above, the Board of Accountancy
is currently comprised of six certified
public accountants, two public accountants, and four public members (none of
whom are unlicensed accounting practitioners). When the Board adopted Rule 2
in 1948, it consisted of five licensed
accountants.
Rule 2 purports to clarify Business
and Professions Code section 5058,
which prohibits the use of modified titles
likely to be confused with "certified public accountant" and "public accountant":
No person or partnership shall
assume or use the title or designation "chartered accountant," "certified accountant," "enrolled
accountant," "registered accountant" or "licensed accountant," or
any other title or designation likely to be confused with "certified
public accountant" or "public
accountant," or any of the abbreviations "C.A ., "E.A ., "R.A.,"
or "L.A.," or similar abbreviations likely to be confused with
"C.P.A., or "P.A."; provided, that
any person qualified as a certified
public accountant under this
chapter who also holds a comparable title granted under the laws
of another country may use such
title in conjunction with the title
of "certified public accountant"
or "C.P.A." 6
Rule 2-as adopted in 1948 and currently-prohibits non-CPAs from using
the unmodified terms "accountant,"
"auditor," "accounting," and "auditing"
as well as "any other titles or designa-
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tions which imply that the individual is
engaged in the practice of public accountancy" as "likely to be confused with"
the restricted titles. The adoption of this
rule by a board dominated by persons
with a pecuniary stake in the rulemaking
decision, and which is adverse to the
interests of unregulated competitors,
violates the due process rights of unlicensed accountants who compete with
CPAs for accountancy business in the
marketplace.
Numerous cases illustrate the principle that members of a multi-member
governmental entity may not abuse their
agency rulemaking authority to promote
their own pecuniary interests. In Bayside
Timber Company, Inc. v. Board of
Supervisors of San Mateo County,7 the
First District Court of Appeal struck
down a regulatory scheme mandated by
statute, wherein timber operators and
loggers were permitted to collude in cartel-like fashion to adopt rules regulating
logging in various state districts under
the jurisdiction of the State Board of
Forestry.
Under Public Resources Code sections 630-31, the State Board of Forestry
was comprised of seven members: six
were required to be members of timberrelated industries, and the seventh member was a public member. The Forest
Practice Act, Public Resources Code
sections 4521-4618, established regional
forest practice committees, each comprised of four timber owners in the
region and one Board of Forestry
employee who voted only in the event of
a tie among the timber owners. The committees were delegated the authority to
develop logging policies which, if
approved by two-thirds of the timber
owners in the district, were submitted to
the Board of Forestry for approval. Such
policies, if approved by the State Board,
had the force of law-much like Rule 2
at issue in the Moore case.
Faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of the regulatory scheme
established in the Forest Practice Act,
the court held that the legislature's standardless delegation of authority to industry-controlled regional committees was
"violative of the state and federal Constitutions...and otherwise denies due process of law to the interested and affected
public."8 Concluding that, under the
statutory scheme, "the content of the
rules under which private logging operations are conducted is decreed exclusively by persons pecuniarily interested
in the timber industry, i.e., timber owners and operators,"9 the First District
invalidated the statute, recognizing the
"age-old principle of our law that no
man should judge or otherwise officially
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preside over disputed matters in which
he has a pecuniary interest."'"
The Bayside Timber court found the
presence of non-industry members on
the Board of Forestry to be an ineffective safeguard against the heavy bias in
favor of logging interests created by the
statutory scheme. Additionally, the court
found that the interest in protecting
against public injury (that is, "public
injury [which] must inevitably result
from placing exclusive control of the
logging industry in the hands of persons
who may be expected to profit most
from the gathering of logs at the lowest
cost and without environmental safeguards") deserves the same if not greater
level of protection as does the potential
injury to "individual private rights
resulting from the creation of unfairly
constituted public boards.""
In support of its conclusion, the Bayside Timber court cited the decision of
the California Supreme Court in State
Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux
Cleaners,'2 wherein the Court struck
down a statute allowing the Board to
establish minimum price schedules for
the dry cleaning industry. Noting that the
Board was dominated by members of the
industry (by a 6-1 majority), the
Supreme Court ruled that the make-up of
the Board was unreasonable and a constitutionally invalid exercise of the
state's police power. "Where the Legislature attempts to delegate its powers to
an administrative board made up of
interested members of the industry, the
majority of which can initiate regulatory
action by the board in that industry, that
delegation may well be brought into
question."' 3
UnconstitutionalEnforcement.
Whereas the Bayside Timber and ThriftD-Lux courts considered issues of unfair
agency rulemaking due to an improperly-constituted board, other courts have
focused on issues of unfair agency adjudication/enforcement action by boards
controlled by members of the very
industry being regulated. In Gibson v.
Berryhill,'4 the U.S. Supreme Court
found that the Alabama Board of
Optometry was an unfair tribunal for
purposes of instituting adjudicatory proceedings against competitor licensed
optometrists. The Board, which consisted exclusively of private-practice
optometrists, instituted disciplinary
actions against several licensed
optometrists who were employed by
business corporations. The respondent
corporate optometrists filed a civil rights
action in federal court in an attempt to
enjoin the Board's disciplinary proceedings. The district court halted the
Board's action on two grounds: (1)pre-

judgment (the Board had previously
filed a complaint in state court against
these same corporate optometrist respondents, alleging unlawful practice of
optometry and unprofessional conduct);
and (2) pecuniary interest (the court
found that the respondent corporate
optometrists accounted for nearly half
the practicing optometrists in Alabama;
if the licenses of these optometrists were
revoked, the private practitioner board
members would personally benefit).
In enjoining the Board's license revocation action, the Supreme Court held:
"[airguably, the District Court was right
on both scores, but we need reach, and
we affirm, only on the latter ground of
possible personal interest."' 6 Citing the
landmark cases of Tumey v. Ohio" and
Ward v. Village of Monroeville,'8 the
Court stated that "[i]t is sufficiently clear
from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes." Further, the Supreme Court cited
the district court's reasoning that "the
inquiry was not whether the Board members were 'actually biased but whether,
in the natural course of events, there is
an indication of a possible temptation to
an average man sitting as a judge to try
the case with bias for or
9 against any
issue presented to him.""
Similarly, in a series of cases, California courts have considered the constitutionality of the composition of the
New Motor Vehicle Board (NMVB) for
purposes of adjudicatory decisionmaking. In American Motors Sales Corp. v.
°
New Motor Vehicle Board,"
the Third
District Court of Appeal considered a
challenge to the make-up of the NMVB,
which in 1973 was authorized to adjudicate disputes between new car dealers
and manufacturers. In just such a dispute, the NMVB ruled that a manufacturer's termination of a dealer's franchise was "without good cause." The
manufacturer appealed the ruling on
grounds that the Board-consisting of
four dealer members and five public
members-was constitutionally disqualified from deciding such cases on
grounds of institutional bias. The court
held:
The conclusion is unavoidable
that dealer-members of the Board
have an economic stake in every
franchise termination case that
comes before them. The ability of
manufacturers to terminate any
dealership, including that of a
Board member, depends entirely
upon the Board's interpretation of
"good cause." ... [T]he objectionable feature of dealer-membership on the Board is the distinct

possibility that a dealer-manufacturer controversy will not be
decided on its merits but on the
potential pecuniary interest of the
dealer-members.2 '
The court held that, for purposes of
resolving dealer-manufacturer disputes,
the statutory composition of the NMVB
deprived manufacturers of their due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal
due to a combination of four factors: (I)
the required presence of dealer-Board
members; (2) the lack of any counterbalance in mandated manufacturer members; (3) the nature of the adversaries in
all cases (dealers against manufacturers);
and (4) the nature of the controversy in
all cases (dispute between dealer and
manufacturer).
As the Board of Accountancy has
argued in Moore, the NMVB protested
that the mere presence of industry members on a board empowered to both
adopt rules and adjudicate does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation,
and that "a disqualifying bias may not be
inferred from the mere circumstance of
the adjudicator's private life. 2' 2 The
Third District rejected this argument on
several grounds. First, the court held that
the legislature erred in enacting the 1973
amendment expanding the NMVB's
jurisdiction to include the adjudication
of disputes between dealers and manufacturers, while maintaining the Board's
prior composition (which included no
manufacturer representatives). "This
legislative partisanship damns the
Board. The State may not establish an
adjudicatory tribunal so constituted as to
slant its judicial attitude in favor of one
class of litigants over another. By doing
so in this instance, the Legislature violated its obligation to assure evenhanded3
ness in the adjudicatory process.
Second, the court noted that "we do
not rest our holding upon simple status.
Because the challenged Board members
have a 'substantial pecuniary interest' in
franchise termination cases (cf. Gibson
v. Berryhill, supra), their mandated presence on the Board potentially prevented
a fair and unbiased examination of the
issues before it in this case, in violation
of due process."2
Third, the court ruled that the presence of some non-industry members on
the Board does not cure the constitutional defect. "The evil here lies in the
state's insistence that under all circumstances the adjudicatory deck of cards
be stacked in favor of car dealers. That
evil is not eliminated by stacking the
deck four-ninths of the way rather than
all the way."' Thus, the court indicated
sensitivity to the fact that dealer-members might exert undue influence on the
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sensibilities and votes of public members.
Subsequent to the Third District's
opinion in American Motors, the legislature amended the NMVB statute to eliminate dealer-member involvement in
NMVB disputes between dealers and
manufacturers.26 But in 1979, the legislature amended the statute again to provide that dealer-members "may participate in, hear, and comment or advise
other members upon, but may not
decide" any matter involving a dealermanufacturer dispute. 27 This provision
was also declared unconstitutional for
failing to guarantee due process in
Chevrolet Motor Division v. NMVB20 and
Nissan Motor Corp. v. NMVB.2" These
courts openly recognized the persuasive
influence which industry members may
be expected to wield in conducting agency business:
Because of their ongoing working relationship, public members
of the Board may be influenced
by arguments or facts suggested
by the dealer members but not
included in the public record, and
the parties themselves may not
have the opportunity to respond.
In short, the presence of biased
members on the Board presents a
substantial probability that decisions in dealer-manufacturer disputes will be made on the basis of
inappropriate considerations, and
the fact that those members do
not technically "decide" the disputes does not alter that probability. Each of the factors in American Motors is still present. 0
Due Process Principles Compel the
Invalidation of Rule 2. The fairness
principles illustrated in these cases are
easily applied to Moore. In Bayside Timber, the timber-industry-controlled
Board of Forestry adopted rules suggested by timber-industry-controlled regional committees and approved by twothirds of the timber industry in the
regions. Those rules invariably favored
the timber industry to the detriment of
the general public and other interests
ostensibly sought to be protected by the
Forest Practice Act. In Gibson, an
optometry board controlled by one segment of the profession targeted another
segment of that profession for enforcement proceedings. Both actions were
invalidated on due process grounds.
Here, the Board of Accountancy in
1948-comprised of five licensed
accountants, no public members, and no
members representing
unlicensed
accountant practitioners lawfully rendering services under Business and Professions Code section 5062 (now
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5052)-conducted formal rulemaking
proceedings and adopted a regulation
with the force of law which prohibits
another kind of accountant from using
the term "accountant" or "accounting" to
describe his/her services. The Board
then abused its enforcement powers by
issuing cease and desist letters and
threatening criminal prosecution. It further has the statutory authority to levy
citations and fines against licensees and
nonlicensees who violate Board statutes
or regulations.3 ' As testified to at the
Moore trial, that rule and its enforcement
has a detrimental impact on the ability of
non-CPA accounting practitioners to
advertise their services to those most in
need of them through the usual means of
advertising-the telephone directory
under the heading "Accountant."
There is no question that Bonnie
Moore (who has a college degree in
accounting and twenty years' experience
in the accounting field) and the other
plaintiffs perform only the acts allowed
them in section 5052 of the Business and
Professions Code; there is also no question that the term which most accurately
and truthfully describes those lawfullyperformed acts is "accounting" or
"accountant." The Board does not contend that Bonnie Moore or the other
plaintiffs have ever represented themselves to be "certified public accountants" or "public accountants." They
seek only to render the services permitted them under section 5052 of the
Business and Professions Code, and to
exercise constitutionally protected commercial speech rights by truthfully
advertising the availability of those services in the manner most familiar to
those who would be their customers. Yet
their competitors-CPAs who dominate
the Board of Accountancy, who have a
substantial pecuniary interest in preventing independent accountants from advertising in the usual manner and providing
those services, and who stand to gain
from that inability to so advertise and so
practice-have adopted and are attempting to enforce a rule which stands to
wipe out the practice of unlicensed
accountancy expressly permitted by the
legislature. The Bayside Timber and
Gibson courts would invalidate that anticompetitive and unfair rule; so should
the Supreme Court now considering it.
Rule 2 is Anticompetitive and
Harms the Public Interest. The formal
audit, with its accompanying certified
opinion of soundness, is the only
accounting function reserved exclusively
to Board licensees.12 However, less than
20% of CPA firms perform these audits
as their main source of income. 3 Most
certified public accountants compete
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with unlicensed individuals and firms for
the wide range of overlapping accounting services sought by consumers. That
is, CPAs and unlicensed accountants
directly compete for at least 80% of
the accounting business in the marketplace;'both licensees and nonlicensees
seek to perform the identical services.
By excluding independent accountants
from advertising or describing themselves as "accountants," the Board has
effectively limited competition for nonaudit clients. The industry-dominated
Board has allowed its substantial pecuniary interest to outweigh the strong policy against anticompetitive agency conduct illustrated in Gibson, Bayside
Timbe; and Thrift-D-Lux.
That the Board's Rule 2 harms Bonnie Moore and other independent
accountants, to the benefit of CPAs permitted to easily and accurately advertise
those same services, is clear. But it also
harms the general public, the small business, the farmer, the sole practitioner, the
individual in need of the accounting services described in Business and Professions Code section 5052 but without the
wherewithal (or need) to pay a CPA.
This interest was recognized as valid and
deserving of protection in Bayside Timber and should be equally recognized by
the Supreme Court in Moore.
Under section 5052, unlicensed
accounting firms may lawfully perform
the services usually required by the general public. These services are available
from licensee accounting firms which
may readily advertise in an accessible
manner, but the hourly fee may be more
than double that of Bonnie Moore and
other plaintiffs. While licensees must be
qualified to perform highly technical
audits, the usual individual or small
business has no need for those sophisticated skills (and they clearly should not
be required to pay for them, or for the
substantial overhead costs incurred by
licensed CPA firms). Unlicensed firms
such as Bonnie Moore's Accounting
Center are not permitted to and do not
perform at that technical and complex
level, yet they are restricted from truthfully reaching those most in need of their
services. When consumers who require
accounting services are prevented from
locating an entire class of providers, it is
they who suffer irreparable harm-not
the Board-licensed CPAs who adopted
Rule 2 and have threatened criminal
prosecution to enforce it.
The Board contends that the use of
the term "accountant" or "accounting"
by nonlicensees is deceptive and misleading; however, it is the Board's
restriction of the use of that term which
is shamefully misleading. Under the
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Board's Rule 2, only Board licensees are
"accountants" and may legally advertise
"accounting" services. The Board
ignores the fact that the legislature has
reserved a wide range of accounting services for nonlicensees, and has not precluded nonlicensees from using the term
"accountant" or "accounting." The
Board's message to the public-that
only Board-licensed CPAs are "accountants"-is legally erroneous, factually
inaccurate, and a regrettable but all too
common reflection of cartel self-interest.
Most troublesome, this cartel is operating in the garb of a state agency with an
obligation to protect the public. The
question is, how do we hold accountable
a state agency of accountants expropriating public power for private self-aggrandizement?
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